

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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Control: 22856  
Rec'd: JUNE 30, 1958  
4:54 P.M.

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Info

FROM: BERLIN

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1411, JUNE 30, 7 PM

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SENT PRIORITY BONN 1341, REPEATED INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 1411.

BONN PASS INFORMATION PRIORITY USAREUR 315

REFERENCE OURTEL SENT BONN 1324, DEPARTMENT 1392, USAREUR 310  
EMBASSY TELEGRAM 832 TO BERLIN.

SX 4947.

1. AT MEETING TODAY BETWEEN ALLIED POLITICAL ADVISERS AND  
COL. MARKUSHIN IT QUICKLY BECAME CLEAR THAT SOVIET INTERPRETATION  
OF HODES-ZAKHAROV EXCHANGES DIFFERS RADICALLY FROM AMERICAN  
VERSION.

2. AS CHAIRMAN FOR MONTH FRENCH OPENED MEETING COMMENTING  
THAT, BECAUSE OF HODES-ZAKHAROV EXCHANGES PLUS RECENT TURNBACK  
OF US CONVOY, NEW ELEMENTS ADDED TO SITUATION WHICH MADE IT  
DESIRABLE THAT AMERICAN POLITICAL ADVISER LEAD DISCUSSION FOR  
WESTERN POWERS. AT PRIOR MEETING POLITICAL ADVISERS BRITISH  
AND FRENCH HAD AGREED TO STAND ON POSITION A AND, IF SOVIET  
ACCEPTED SAMPLE DOCUMENT, THAT THEY WOULD RECOMMEND IT TO THEIR  
SUPERIORS.

3. WE REFERRED TO RECENT EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES BETWEEN HODES-  
ZAKHAROV, NOTING THAT THESE APPEARED TO PROVIDE POSSIBLE BASIS  
FOR UNDERSTANDING ON DOCUMENTATION. SAID WE HAD PREPARED  
SAMPLE DOCUMENT COVERING ALL REQUISITE POINTS ON ONE PIECE  
PAPER. FOLLOWING PERUSAL OF SAMPLE DOCUMENT, MARKUSHIN STATED  
QUESTIONS RAISED BY DOCUMENT APPEARED BROADER THAN DISCUSSION  
AT LAST MEETING HAD INDICATED. HE THEN SAID HE WOULD SUGGEST  
SOME AMENDMENTS TO FORM.

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-2- 1411, JUNE 30, 7 PM., FROM BERLIN.

THESE WERE:

A. MORE DETAILED SPECIFICATIONS OF TYPE OF CARGO, THAT IS, A BREAKDOWN SHOWING CARGO CARRIED AS ARMAMENT, FOODSTUFFS OR OTHER EQUIPMENT. B. TOTAL WEIGHT OF CARGO SHOULD BE SHOWN AND NUMBER OF CASES, BARRELS, OR OTHER CONTAINERS. E. IF SUCH A LISTING MADE SOVIET CHECKPOINT OFFICER WOULD, OF COURSE, RESERVE RIGHT TO LOOK INTO COVERED TRUCKS TO INSURE THAT CARGO CARRIED AGREED WITH MANIFEST. HE ADDED THAT IN THIS WAY SOVIETS WOULD BE ABLE FULLY TO CARRY OUT PROCEDURE OF CONTROL SPECIFIED IN AGREEMENT OF JUNE 29, 1945.

4. WE REPLIED WE THOUGHT THAT, AT PREVIOUS MEETING WITH MARKUSHIN, TERM "SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT" HAD BEEN AGREED UPON AS SUFFICIENT IN PRINCIPLE. WE EMPHASIZED THAT WE COULD NOT (REPEAT NOT) AGREE TO POINTS MADE BY MARKUSHIN REGARDING LISTING OF CARGO AND WOULD ONLY REPORT HIS POSITION TO HIGHER AUTHORITIES. WE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT HIS SUGGESTED BREAKDOWN SERVED ANY NECESSARY PURPOSE. IF CARGO CERTIFIED AS MILITARY SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT BY COMPETENT MILITARY AUTHORITY THAT SHOULD SUFFICE. MARKUSHIN REPLIED THAT THREE CATEGORIES MENTIONED WERE IMPORTANT, AND IF SUCH BREAKDOWN NOT PROVIDED SUGGESTED DOCUMENTATION WOULD SERVE NO USEFUL PURPOSE. HE ADDED THAT IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO DESCRIBE IN DETAIL TYPE ARMAMENT CARRIED, I. E. RIFLES, TANK PARTS, MACHINE GUNS, ETC. WHAT WAS IMPORTANT WAS CATEGORY OF SUPPLIES AND IN CASE OF FOODSTUFFS (TONNAGE OR KILOGRAM WEIGHT) AND OTHER EQUIPMENT (NUMBER OF CASES OR OTHER CONTAINERS). WE AGAIN STRESSED PRINCIPLE INVOLVED, EMPHASIZING IT WAS GEN HODES' (AND WE HAD THOUGHT GEN ZAKHOROV'S) UNDERSTANDING IF OFFICER CERTIFIED TO GENERAL NATURE OF CONTENTS, HIS WORD SHOULD BE ENOUGH. AS TO SOVIET CLAIM TO INSPECT CARGO VEHICLES, WE POINTED OUT, THIS WOULD BE COMPLETELY INCOMPATIBLE WITH LONG-STANDING PRECEDENT AND WAS OBJECTIONABLE IN PRINCIPLE.

5. IN REPLY TO REQUEST FOR HIS COMMENTS ON REMAINDER OF FORM APART FROM SECTION ON CARGO DOCUMENTATION, MARKUSHIN HEDGED, STATING HE HAD PAID PARTICULAR ATTENTION ONLY TO DISPUTABLE ITEM.

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ITEM. HE DID COMMENT, HOWEVER, THAT PORTION OF SAMPLE DOCUMENT COVERING PERSONNEL WOULD REPRESENT WEAKENING OF SOVIET CONTROLS AS NOW ENFORCED. HE REQUESTED TIME TO STUDY DOCUMENT FURTHER AND TO OBTAIN INSTRUCTIONS. REGARDING SUFFICIENCY OF "OFFICER'S WORD", HE SAID HE DID NOT MEAN HIS COMMENTS TO INFER ANY DISTRUST OF ALLIES. ON CONTRARY, IF DISTRUST WERE INVOLVED SOVIETS WOULD HAVE DEMANDED THAT INDIVIDUAL CONTAINERS BE BROKEN OPEN FOR INSPECTION, WHICH NOT DONE AT PRESENT NOR INTENDED IN FUTURE. SOVIETS PERMITTED ALLIES TO BRING TO BERLIN VIA AUTOBAHN PRACTICALLY WHAT THEY WISHED. DOCUMENTATION BY CARGO TYPE AND QUANTITY IS NECESSARY MEASURES OF CONTROL, AND IT THEREFORE NOT CLEAR TO SOVIETS WHY POLITICAL ADVISERS UNWILLING AGREE TO HAVE THIS INFORMATION ON MANIFEST. WEST HAS NOTHING TO LOSE, AND SOVIETS'S ONLY AIM IS TO MAKE IMPOSSIBLE CASES OF ABUSE ON PART OF DRIVERS AND NCO'S WHO TRAVEL ON TRUCKS. MARKUSHIN DID NOT BELIEVE QUESTION OF CARGO DOCUMENTATION OF SUFFICIENT IMPORTANCE TO NECESSITATE FURTHER REFERRAL TO COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF. HE CONCLUDED BY STATING SOVIETS WOULD STUDY OUR DRAFT AND AT SUBSEQUENT MEETING HE WOULD COMMENT ON FIRST PART.

6. AFTER STATING THAT HE SUPPORTED U.S. POSITION AS PRESENTED, FRENCH POLITICAL ADVISER THEN NOTED THAT MARKUSHIN'S SUGGESTED PROCEDURE APPEARED MUCH LIKE A CUSTOMS' CHECK. THIS MARKUSHIN DENIED, STATING IN CUSTOMS' CHECK EACH INDIVIDUAL ITEM EXAMINED WHEREAS THIS NOT SOVIET PURPOSE. MARKUSHIN STATED: 1. HIS SUGGESTED PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED AS INTENTION TO IMPOSE CUSTOMS TYPE CONTROL; 2. SOVIET CHECKPOINT OFFICERS WOULD GLANCE AT TRUCK CONTENTS ONLY TO SEE IF NUMBERS OF CASES MATCHED NUMBERS LISTED ON MANIFEST. IF TRUCK WAS OPEN, NO NEED TO ENTER VEHICLE IF CARGO READILY APPARENT FROM OUTSIDE, BUT IF TRUCK COVERED, CHECKPOINT OFFICER MUST LOOK IN TO EXAMINE CARGO.

7. MARKUSHIN ASKED IF BRITISH HAD COMMENT, AND BRITISH POLITICAL ADVISER STATED ONLY THAT SOVIET PROPOSALS REPRESENTED "A GRAVE DEPARTURE FROM ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES". OTHERWISE HE COULD ONLY STRESS HIS CONCURRENCE WITH U.S.

8. MARKUSHIN

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8. MARKUSHIN CLOSED MEETING WITH COMMENT THAT, IF POLITICAL ADVISERS WOULD EXPLAIN SOVIET MOTIVES TO SUPERIORS, HE WAS CERTAIN THEY WOULD AGREE WITH HIS PROPOSALS. HE QUERIED WHETHER FIRST PART OF PROPOSED FORM INTENDED TO COVER ONLY GROUPS OF TRUCKS. WE REPLIED THAT SAMPLE DOCUMENT COULD BE MODIFIED FOR USE EITHER BY SINGLE TRUCK OR CONVOY OF TRUCKS.

COMMENT:

9. WE HAVE IMPRESSION THAT NEW, STIFFER SOVIET POSITION ON CARGO DOCUMENTATION STEMS DIRECTLY FROM INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED FROM GENERAL OF ARMY ZAKHAROV'S HEADQUARTERS. MARKUSHIN HAD NEVER PREVIOUSLY HINTED THAT VERIFICATION OF MANIFESTS WAS IMMEDIATE SOVIET OBJECTIVE. ON JUNE 28 BRITISH MILITARY RADIO TRUCK TURNED BACK AT NOWAWES CHECKPOINT WHEN SOVIETS NOT PERMITTED HAVE LOOK AT CONTENTS. IN RESPONSE TO PROTEST BY ACTING BRITISH POLITICAL ADVISER, MARKUSHIN STATED THAT SOVIET CONTROL OFFICER AT CHECKPOINT HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY GENERAL OF ARMY ZAKHAROV TO EXERCISE DISCRETION AS TO WHETHER HE SHOULD LOOK AT CONTENTS OF TRUCKS. HOWEVER, SINCE ACTING BRITISH POLITICAL ADVISER HAD VOUCHERED FOR MILITARY NATURE OF CONTENTS TRUCK WOULD BE ALLOWED TO PASS IN THIS INSTANCE WITHOUT INSPECTION.

10. WHILE IN GOOD HUMOR AND COURTEOUS IN MANNER, MARKUSHIN PRESENTED SOVIET POSITION WITHOUT HESITATION AND GAVE NO INDICATION MUCH SCOPE LEFT FOR CONCESSIONS. BRITISH AND FRENCH ARE OBVIOUSLY NOT HAPPY WITH DIRECTION IN WHICH SITUATION DEVELOPING. THEY FIND OMINOUS REFERENCE TO MILITARY TRAINS IN THIRD PARAGRAPH JUNE 28 MESSAGE FROM ZAKHAROV TO CINCUSAREUR. ALSO NOTED WITH US THAT REFERENCE TO QUANTITY AND NATURE OF MILITARY CARGO SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ZAKHAROV'S MESSAGE FOREWARNED THAT SOVIETS WOULD NOT BE SATISFIED WITH LISTING OF CARGO MERELY AS "MILITARY SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT".

HILLENBRAND

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